QKD Quantum Channel Authentication by Kosloski, J. T.
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
06
03
10
1v
2 
 2
 A
pr
 2
00
6
QKD Quantum Channel Authentication
J.T. Kosloski
National Security Agency, 9800 Savage Road, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland 20755
∗
(Dated: April 18, 2018)
Abstract
Several simple yet secure protocols to authenticate the quantum channel of various QKD schemes, by coupling
the photon sender’s knowledge of a shared secret and the QBER Bob observes, are presented. It is shown that
Alice can encrypt certain portions of the information needed for the QKD protocols, using a sequence whose
security is based on computational-complexity, without compromising all of the sequence’s entropy. It is then
shown that after a Man-in-the-Middle attack on the quantum and classical channels, there is still enough entropy
left in the sequence for Bob to detect the presence of Eve by monitoring the QBER. Finally, it is shown that
the principles presented can be implemented to authenticate the quantum channel associated with any type of
QKD scheme, and they can also be used for Alice to authenticate Bob.
1 Introduction
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) has gained consid-
erable interest in the academic and commercial sectors
in recent years because of its ability to offer absolute
security against all attacks that can be carried out on
classical and quantum computers. This is in stark con-
trast to current classical public-key schemes that have
been shown to be vulnerable to attacks on a quantum
computer [1]. However, these same classical schemes do
have a significant advantage in that they can be used to
authenticate messages and eliminate Man-in-the-Middle
attacks, at least when Eve (the adversary) is limited to
a classical computer. In the absence of an authenticated
public channel, most QKD protocols, such as BB84 [2],
are not secure against Man-in-the-Middle attacks.
The current method to secure commercially viable
QKD protocols against such an attack is to authenticate
the classical communications between Alice and Bob.
This prevents Eve from establishing key with either one
because she would not be able to carry out the clas-
sical communications necessary for the protocols, and
she would be limited to attacks that increase Bob’s ob-
served quantum bit error rate (QBER). The Wegman-
Carter authentication scheme [3] and variations thereof
[4] seem to be the most commonly implemented methods
to authenticate QKD public channels. They also seem
to be sufficient to protect against Man-in-the-Middle at-
tacks. However, these schemes do not actually authenti-
cate the users of a quantum channel, and there could be
situations where this is desired.
There have been several quantum authentication pro-
tocols developed for the purpose of authenticating quan-
tum messages [5] [6] [7], with much of the focus being on
the use of entanglement. A quantum message is a nor-
mal message sent over a quantum channel using quan-
tum codes. On the other hand, only random bits are
transmitted over the quantum channel in QKD, and all
messages are sent over the classical channel. In many of
the quantum message authentication schemes, a shared
secret is used to encrypt a message that is transmit-
ted using one of several quantum codes. An imposter
is then detected by monitoring the errors in the code
words. One problem these schemes have is the inherent
structure in the codes and Eve’s ability to take advantage
of possible correlations between two sequential bits, re-
sulting from the structures of quantum codes. However,
in QKD, there are no bit-to-bit correlations, assuming a
perfectly random raw bit sequence, so it seems reason-
able that QKD could be simpler to authenticate than a
quantum message. In this article, it is shown that the
quantum-based security of entanglement-based authen-
tication may not be necessary, and that computational-
complexity-based schemes are sufficient to authenticate
the quantum channel of a QKD system.
Four protocols are presented, each of which requires
only a shared secret and a key-expansion function, in
addition to the standard QKD protocols, to detect an
imposter. Through examples of Man-in-the-Middle at-
tacks, it is shown that even though information about
the shared secret will be leaked to Eve during a QKD ses-
sion, as long as determining the shared secret (given the
expanded key) requires more computation than is possi-
ble in a few seconds, there is enough entropy remaining
in the expanded key for Bob to detect the presence of an
imposter by monitoring the QBER. Finally, it is shown
that the basic principles used for these protocols can be
implemented to authenticate the quantum channel as-
sociated with any type of QKD scheme, and that these
protocols can also be used for Alice to authenticate Bob.
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2 Protocols
Consider the situation where Alice and Bob are going
to generate key using BB84 and have an n-bit shared
secret K, where n is chosen based on the level of desired
security. Also suppose that Alice and Bob have agreed
on a key expansion function F (), which need not be kept
secret, that they consider secure from time-limited cryp-
tographic attacks on both classical and quantum com-
puters. The time it takes to determine K given F (K)
needs to be longer than the time it takes to perform a
QKD session.
For notational purposes, let F (K)i be the ith bit
of the expanded sequence, which is synchronized with
clocks at Alice and Bob. Let xt and yt be Alice’s bit
and basis choice at time t, and let zt be Bob’s basis
choice. Let the observable being used (phase, polariza-
tion, orbital angular momentum, ...) be represented by
Γ, and let the two conjugate bases be denoted by Γ0 and
Γ1. To put the notation into context, the quantum por-
tion of BB84 is carried out when Alice sends Γyt = x
t
and Bob measures Γzt .
Each of the protocols below allow Bob, after Error
Correction (EC), to conclude whether or not the photons
originated with an impersonator, as well as whether or
not he communicated with an impersonator during ei-
ther sifting or EC, depending on the protocol. That is
not to say that these protocols protect against the possi-
bility that Eve is intercepting information, which is the
purpose of the actual QKD protocol, but it does say that
the information did not originate with Eve.
Note that F (K), which is a pseudo-random bit se-
quence, will not be available to Eve for analysis until
she has recovered the random bit stream with which it
is combined, such as Alice’s bit or basis choices, because
a random stream Xored with any stream produces a
random stream. So, Eve will not even be able to begin
working on the recovery of K until after EC. It should
also be noted that in the protocols below, 1a and 2a have
timing limitations that 1b and 2b do not. Namely, 1a and
2a are only secure if Eve does not have the opportunity
to complete the entire Alice-Eve session before starting
Eve-Bob because Eve can simply omit sending a photon
to Bob for the times that correspond to j ∈ {t} for which
he did not learn F (K)j , and Bob would attribute a lack
of detection events to attenuation of the photons. Con-
versely, 1b and 2b force Eve to use a continuous stream
of F (K) starting at F (K)0, so she cannot avoid times
for which she does not know F (K)t. Also note that the
timing requirement for the first two protocols is not un-
reasonable and can easily be met.
Protocol 1.a
1. (a) Alice sends a photon with Γyt = x
t ⊕ F (K)t.
(b) Bob measures Γzt , and records
x′t = Γzt ⊕ F (K)
t.
(c) This step continues until enough photons have
been sent for Bob to accurately calculate the
QBER.
2. Alice and Bob perform bit distillation. Alice pub-
licly discloses the set of her basis choices, {y}. Bob
then compares {y} to {z} and publicly discloses a
list of the times that have valid bits. (Alice→ Bob
Sifting using {y} and {z})
3. Alice and Bob perform EC on the bits of {x} and
{x′} retained after sifting, using some agreed-upon
scheme such as CASCADE [8]. There is a possi-
bility that the error correction scheme used does
not correct all of the errors, but corrects for some
maximum error rate, ∆, with a high degree of cer-
tainty. ∆ could either be a limitation of the cor-
rection scheme or Alice’s unwillingness to correct
more than a certain number of errors. For simplic-
ity, suppose that QBER ≤ ∆ implies there will
be no errors left after EC (with some degree of
certainty) and QBER > ∆ implies there will be
about a (QBER−∆) error rate after EC.
4. Bob makes a conclusion about the security of the
error-corrected bits. If the QBER is too high, Bob
concludes that either Eve has gained too much in-
formation concerning the key that he established
with Alice (standard BB84 conclusion) or that Al-
ice did not send the original photons (conclusion
concerning the authenticity of the photons).
5. Either Alice and Bob perform privacy amplifica-
tion to create final keys, or they start over.
6. Alice and Bob create a new K. Alice and Bob
take n secure bits, either pre-placed or established
during a QKD session, and create a new K to au-
thenticate the next QKD session.
Protocol 1.b
1. (a) Alice sends a photon with Γyt = x
t.
(b) Bob measures Γzt , and records x
′t = Γzt .
(c) This step continues until enough photons have
been sent for Bob to accurately calculate the
QBER.
2. Alice → Bob Sifting using {y} and {z}. Bob and
Alice then apply the stream F (K) to the bits re-
tained after sifting with a bit-wise Xor.
3. Alice and Bob perform EC on the bits of F (K)
applied to the bits of {x} and {x′} retained after
sifting.
4. Bob makes a conclusion about the security of the
error-corrected bits.
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5. Either Alice and Bob perform privacy amplifica-
tion to create final keys, or they start over.
6. Alice and Bob create a new K.
Security of Protocol 1
The QBER for these protocols is a function of Γ be-
ing measured and any tampering that may occur on the
quantum channel as well as the original sender’s knowl-
edge of the F (K) sequence. If the established QBER
is sufficiently low, Bob concludes that the person he is
communicating with for the EC, over the classical chan-
nel, either knows (Γyt and F (K)
t) or (xt and F (K)t),
for the half of the time slots that correspond to his de-
tection events. This doesn’t directly guarantee that the
photon was originally sent by Alice, but rather guaran-
tees that the person Bob is communicating with for the
EC, over the classical channel, has knowledge that only
the sender of the photons would have as well as knowl-
edge of F (K), which only Alice has. Put another way,
this protocol guarantees that Bob is communicating clas-
sically with the sender of the photons for the EC, and
that the sender knows F (K). Therefore, the original
sender must be Alice.
To understand the security of these protocols, con-
sider the following Man-in-the-Middle attack against
Protocol 1.a, assuming the timing restrictions for Pro-
tocol 1.a, as noted above, have been met.
1. (a) Alice sends a photon with Γyt = x
t ⊕ F (K)t.
(b) Eve measures Γµt , and records χ
t = Γµt .
(c) Eve sends a photon with Ψνt = ξ
t, where Ψ
and Γ are the same observable.
(d) Bob measures Ψzt , and records
xt = Ψzt ⊕ F (K)
t.
(e) This step continues until enough photons have
been sent for Bob to accurately calculate the
QBER.
2. Alice and Eve perform bit distillation. Alice sends
Eve the set of her basis choices, {y}. Eve then
compares {y} to {µ} and sends Alice a list of which
bits to include, with about half of them being dis-
carded. (Alice → Eve sifting)
3. Alice and Eve perform EC. Eve didn’t know F (K),
so she has a .50 error rate in her key, relative to
Alice. After EC, Eve still has a α = max{0, (.50−
∆)} error rate for the bits retained after sifting. If
∆ is sufficiently small, this could prevent Eve from
establishing perfect keys with Alice, and could al-
low Alice to detect an imposter while Alice and
Eve are communicating with the keys.
After EC, Eve’s F (K), for the bits corresponding
to events retained after sifting, has an error rate
of α, and her error rate for the complete F (K) is
then (.25 + α2 ).
4. Eve and Bob perform bit distillation. Eve sends
Bob the set of her basis choices, {ν}. Bob then
compares {ν} to {z} and sends Eve a list of which
bits to include, with about half of them being dis-
carded (Eve → Bob Sifting). As long as Eve did
not know {y} prior to (Alice → Eve Sifting) and
did not know {z} prior to (Eve → Bob Sifting),
about half of the bits retained by Bob and Eve
will correspond to bits retained by Eve and Alice.
5. Eve and Bob perform EC. Eve’s total error rate of
F (K) is (.25+ α2 ), so her key will have a (.25+
α
2 )
error rate relative to Bob’s key.
6. Bob will calculate a .25 ≤ (QBER = .25+α2 ) ≤ .50
and conclude that Eve must be involved.
An analogous Man-in-the-Middle attack carried out
against 1.b would have similar results in practice, but
without the timing restriction. Against 1.b the attack
would, in theory, induce a QBER = α which implies 0 ≤
QBER ≤ .5. However, keeping in mind that the most
trivial attacks against QKD produce aQBER = .25, it is
unlikely that Alice would allow ∆ > .25 and therefore, in
practice, Bob will also calculate .25 < (QBER = α) ≤ .5
with protocol 1.b. Also note that during attacks on 1.a
and 1.b, through interactive EC with Bob, Eve can take
advantage of some of the information she gains during
the interaction to ensure that the QBER appears to be
a little lower than it actually is. This threat can be elim-
inated by using forward error correction, during which
no information is leaked by Bob back to Eve.
Protocol 2.a
1. (a) Alice sends a photon with Γyt⊕F (K)t = x
t.
(b) Bob measures Γzt⊕F (K)t , and records
x′t = Γzt⊕F (K)t .
(c) This step continues until enough photons have
been sent for Bob to accurately calculate the
QBER.
2. Alice → Bob Sifting using {y} and {z}
3. Alice and Bob perform EC on the bits of {x} and
{x′} retained after sifting.
4. Bob makes a conclusion about the security of the
error-corrected bits.
5. Either Alice and Bob perform privacy amplifica-
tion, or they start over.
6. Alice and Bob create a new K.
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Protocol 2.b
1. (a) Alice sends a photon with Γyt = x
t.
(b) Bob measures Γzt , and records x
′t = Γzt .
(c) This step continues until enough photons have
been sent for Bob to accurately calculate the
QBER.
2. Bob publicly discloses a list of the times for which
he had a detection event. Alice and Bob remove
their basis choices for times that do not corre-
spond to detection events to create the sets {y′}
and {z′} respectively. Alice → Bob Sifting using
{y′} ⊕ F (K) and {z′} ⊕ F (K).
3. Alice and Bob perform EC on the bits of {x} and
{x′} retained after sifting.
4. Bob makes a conclusion about the security of the
error-corrected bits.
5. Either Alice and Bob perform privacy amplifica-
tion, or they start over.
6. Alice and Bob create a new K.
Security of Protocol 2
These protocols offer similar assurances to Bob as Pro-
tocols 1.a and 1.b, except that they guarantee, after EC,
that the person with which he performed sifting is some-
one that knows information that only the sender of the
photon and Alice could know. In particular, after EC,
Bob knows that he performed the sifting with someone
who knew both {y} and F (K), otherwise, he would have
randomly selected which bits to use for the EC and would
have a substantial error rate. Therefore, the original
sender must be Alice.
The QBER is a function of Γ being measured and any
tampering that may occur on the quantum channel, in
addition to the original sender not knowing the correct
F (K) sequence that was Xored to Alices’s basis stream.
When Bob is trying to perform EC with a user that does
not know F (K), the error rate will be inflated because
Bob would have randomly selected his bits from all of the
bits, roughly half of which are in the wrong basis. Note
that, unlike in Protocol 1, the knowledge Eve can gain
during interactive EC will not help her reduce the QBER
induced by her not knowing the correct basis during the
sifting. So, for protocols 2.a and 2.b, Eve does not gain
an advantage by performing interactive EC with Bob as
opposed to forward EC.
To understand the security of these two protocols,
consider the following Man-in-the-Middle attack against
Protocol 2.a, assuming that the timing restrictions for
Protocol 2.a, as noted above, have been met (similar se-
curity when carried out against Protocol 2.b, but with-
out the timing restrictions).
Allow for the possibility that Alice-Eve EC is com-
pleted after Eve-Bob photon transmission, but before
Eve-Bob sifting.
1. Eve creates a set of times {τ} that correspond to
bits of F (K) she intends to learn.
2. (a) Alice sends a photon with Γyt⊕F (K)t = x
t.
(b) Eve measures Γµt , and records χ
t = Γµt .
(c) Eve sends a photon with Ψνt = ξ
t if t ∈ {τ},
where Ψ and Γ are the same observable.
(d) Bob measures Ψzt⊕F (K)t , and records
x′t = Ψzt⊕F (K)t if t ∈ {τ}.
(e) This step continues until enough bits have
been sent for Bob to accurately calculate the
QBER.
3. Alice and Eve perform bit distillation. Alice sends
Eve the set {y}. Eve tells Alice that they agreed
on the basis selection for the times t ∈ {τ}
4. Alice and Eve perform EC. Eve didn’t know F (K),
so she has a .25 error rate in her key, relative to
Alice. After EC, Eve still has a (.25−∆) error rate
for the bits retained after sifting. Again, ∆ could
be chosen to prevent Eve from establishing perfect
keys with Alice, and could allow Alice to detect the
imposter while Alice and Eve are communicating
with the keys as input to their encryption systems.
To understand what Eve knows after EC with Al-
ice, consider the fact that Eve knows yt and µt for
all t. Through EC she learns yt ⊕ F (K)t 6= µt,
t ∈ {τ}, for some number of errors, which is suf-
ficient to calculate F (K)t for these times. For
the times that she had the correct bit value, Eve
doesn’t know if yt⊕F (K)t = µt or if yt⊕F (K)t 6=
µt. Therefore, Eve’s copy of {F (K)τ}, the bits of
F (K) that correspond to possible detection events
at Bob, has a (γ = max{ .752 ,
1−∆
2 }) error rate.
5. Eve and Bob perform bit distillation. Eve sends
Bob the set {ν} ⊕ F (K ′), where F (K ′) is Eve’s
flawed version of F (K). Bob then compares {ν}⊕
F (K ′) to {z} and sends Eve a list of which bits to
include. This set of events will be about half of the
events included by Eve and Alice.
6. Eve and Bob perform EC. Eve’s error rate of
{F (K ′)τ} is γ, so her key will have a (γ2 ) error
rate relative to Bob’s key.
7. Bob will calculate a .1675 ≤ (QBER = γ2 ) ≤ .25
and conclude that Eve must be involved.
4
3 Conclusions
The security of the shared-secret authentication lies in
Eve’s inability to predict the secret bits, so it is impera-
tive that the secret bits be well protected until Bob has
a chance to verify the sender’s identity. In each of the
above protocols Alice leaks information about F (K) to
the person with whom she is performing EC, so F (K) is
not completely secure. However, as long as determining
K from F (K) is a relatively computationally-intensive
process, then there is enough entropy in the shared secret
during the QKD session to prevent Eve from successfully
carrying out a Man-in-the-Middle attack.
The significance of these protocols is that each of
them could easily be implemented in current QKD sys-
tems and would only require minor software modifica-
tions. Each of the protocols can be used to authenticate
the quantum channel of prepare-and-measure QKD sys-
tems, such as BB84. However, note that in Protocol
2.b, Alice only has to know her basis choice when she
performs sifting and not when actually sending the pho-
tons. This feature allows 2.b to actually be used for any
2-Basis QKD schemes that require bit distillation and
EC, even entanglement schemes. Similarly, Protocol 1.b
only relies on Alice and Bob having a bit stream with
errors and a shared secret, implying that it can be used
with all QKD schemes, even no-switching QKD [9], as
long as the QKD schemes require EC.
Suppose that the roles in the sifting and EC were re-
versed, such that Bob’s key prior to EC was assumed to
be correct, and Bob helped Alice correct her bits that dif-
fered from Bob’s. Alice would then calculate the QBER,
and they could use the protocols for Alice to verify that
the photons were detected by someone who knows F (K),
Bob, and that she communicated with him for the sifting
and EC. For example, Protocol 2.b would only differ in
that Bob would send Alice {z} ⊕ F (K) for sifting, and
they would change roles for EC. Therefore, Alice could
also authenticate Bob’s identity, and they could adjust
the protocols so that they can authenticate each other
for every QKD session.
It should be noted that the protocols presented in
this article belong to a more general class of authentica-
tion protocols that use a shared secret, a symmetric-key
algorithm, and monitoring of the QBER to detect a Man-
in-the-Middle attack. These four were chosen to repre-
sent the versatitlity and utility of the protocols, but were
certainly not inclusive of all of the ways to use classical
cryptography to authenticate a QKD quantum channel.
Alternative protocols could be created by replacing the
F (K)⊕ (Information) step by running the information
through an algorithm such as AES, or varying where the
encrypt/decrypt takes place, among other options. As
was shown, the QBER induced by a Man-in-the-Middle
attack would vary between the different protocols, but
many of the possible protocols in this class are more than
sufficient for authentication purposes.
I would like to thank my colleagues at LLL, LTS, and
NSA for their insightful comments.
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